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ARTICLES

FEDERALISM, REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE, AND THE
CLEAN WATER RULE: SEEKING CONSENSUS ON THE
WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES
BY
ERIN RYAN*

This Article reviews the troubled history of the “Waters of the
United States” Rule of the Clean Water Act, and analyzes how its
newest incarnation harnesses a surprising point of convergence
between the conflicting Supreme Court interpretations in Rapanos v.
United States that necessitated its development. While debate over the
federalism implications of the Rule rages on, the framework it creates
from the multiple Rapanos opinions suggests that the path forward
hinges less on the substantive rule of jurisdiction and more on the
regulatory architecture of presumptions, default rules, and burden
shifting. Splitting the difference between competing judicial
approaches, the new Rule alternates presumptions in favor of and
against federal regulation in different hydrological contexts to
appropriately support competing regulatory goals. By capitalizing on an
elusive thread of continuity among seemingly irreconcilable judicial
viewpoints, the new Rule may win safe passage through the next round
of judicial review.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article reviews the troubled history of the “Waters of the United
States” Rule (the Rule)1 of the Clean Water Act (CWA or Act),2 and analyzes
how its newest incarnation harnesses a surprising point of convergence
between the conflicting Supreme Court interpretations in Rapanos v. United
States (Rapanos)3 that necessitated its development. While debate over the
federalism implications of the Rule rages on,4 the framework it creates from
the multiple Rapanos opinions suggests that the path forward hinges less on
the substantive rule of jurisdiction and more on the regulatory architecture
of presumptions, default rules, and burden shifting.5 Splitting the difference
between competing judicial approaches, the new Rule alternates
presumptions in favor of and against federal regulation in different
hydrological contexts to appropriately support competing regulatory goals.
By capitalizing on an elusive thread of continuity among seemingly
irreconcilable judicial viewpoints, the Clean Water Rule may win safe
passage through the next round of judicial review.
The Rule has long interpreted the part of the CWA6 that establishes the
breadth of American waterways subject to federal protection under the Act.7
Despite decades of effort by agencies, courts, and litigants to clarify the
reach of federal authority under the Rule,8 it remains one of the most

1 Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,058
(Jun. 29, 2015) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3; 40 C.F.R. §§ 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 300,
302, 401 (2016)) [hereinafter Clean Water Rule].
2 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
3 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
4 In re U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 803 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Jonathan Adler,
Once More With Feeling: Reaffirming the Limits of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, in THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS 81 (Vt. L. Sch. Land Use Inst. et al. eds.,
2007).
5 See infra Part IV.B.
6 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012) (defining “navigable waters” as “the waters of the United
States, including the territorial seas”).
7 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,060.
8 See infra Part II.
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persistently uncertain exercises of national regulatory jurisdiction in any
field.9 Because the statutory language construed by the Rule references
navigability as a jurisdictional criterion,10 jurisdictional uncertainty
associated with the Rule is especially pronounced with regard to
nonnavigable wetlands11 that are not directly adjacent to conventionally
navigable lakes and rivers, but that may nonetheless significantly impact
these larger (and clearly jurisdictional) waterways downstream.12 Over the
years, a series of divisive Supreme Court interpretations of the Rule
(culminating in Rapanos) have forced regulatory architects to the drawing
table again and again, striving for a resolution that satisfies the relevant
statutory, judicial, scientific, and public concerns.13
In 2015, following the most recent round of judicial upheaval,
responsive political wrangling, and heated public engagement, a new version
of the Rule—the “Clean Water Rule”14—was finally promulgated by the two
implementing agencies, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).15 The Clean Water Rule
emerged only after several previous attempts to produce clarity had failed,
including regulatory guidance issued by EPA and the Corps in 2008,16 an
9 See, e.g., Mark Latham, Rapanos v. United States: Significant Nexus or Significant
Confusion? The Failure of the Supreme Court to Clearly Define the Scope of Federal Wetland
Jurisdiction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS, supra note 4, at 5–

6, (discussing the “continued puzzlement concerning the reach of federal wetlands
jurisdiction”).
10 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2012) (prohibiting the “discharge of any pollutant” except as in
compliance with the enumerated sections). The Act further defines “discharge of a pollutant” as
“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” Id. § 1362(12)
(emphasis added).
11 “Wetlands” are defined as areas of specially adapted hydric or saturated soils, technically
including navigable lakes and rivers as well as smaller and/or seasonal ponds, streams, marshes,
swamps, bogs, and other nonnavigable waterways. See Ralph W. Tiner, Technical Aspects of
Wetlands:
Wetland
Definitions
and
Classifications
in
the
United
States,
https://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/definitions.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (describing
wetlands as “different kinds of wet habitats”). For the purpose of the Rule, “wetlands” refer
primarily to nonnavigable hydric soils that are “wet for some period of time, but not necessarily
permanently wet.” Id.; see also Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,106 (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 110.1(3)(iv)) (defining wetlands as “areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or
groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to support . . . vegetation typically adapted
for life in saturated soil conditions”).
12 See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057 (explaining that “[w]etlands and open
waters in floodplains and riparian areas are chemically, physically, and biologically connected
with downstream waters and influence the ecological integrity of such waters”). Uncertainty is
especially associated with remote wetlands because the Supreme Court firmly approved CWA
jurisdiction over directly adjacent wetlands in U.S. v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121
(1985).
13 See infra Part II (discussing the history of the Rule and these important judicial
interventions).
14 See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Clean Water Rule, http://www.epa.gov/cleanwaterrule
(last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (highlighting the name of the rule).
15 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054.
16 Memorandum from Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Adm’r for Water, U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, & John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Sec’y of the Army (Civil Works), Dep’t of the Army,
Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United
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earlier attempt by the implementing agencies to revise the Rule in 2011,17 and
various proposals for direct statutory reform by Congress18—some of which
would have strengthened federal reach,19 while others would have weakened
it.20 Crafted amidst this intense political dissensus, the Clean Water Rule
seeks a compromise position between competing extremes, clarifying limits
on federal reach while remaining grounded in the best available hydrological
science.21 It reduces the need for case-by-case analysis in some contexts
while preserving it in others,22 mitigating the uncertainty that has
undermined the regulatory process while preserving flexibility to cope with
harder calls.
The Clean Water Rule continues to assert categorical jurisdiction over
most navigable waterways23 and tributaries that are characterized by a bed,
banks, and ordinary high water mark,24 and it includes directly adjacent
wetlands (within specified distances).25 These waterways will be subject to
federal jurisdiction without further analysis, although based on a set of
measurable, physical criteria that limit the categorical assertion of federal

States & Carabell v. United States (Dec. 2, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 Jurisdiction Guidance],
available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/regulatory/cwa_guide/cwa_
juris_2dec08.pdf.
17 See CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43455, EPA AND THE ARMY CORPS’ RULE
TO DEFINE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” 1 (2016) (discussing the 2011 proposed rule, which
was never adopted, and the preceding 2008 regulatory guidance).
18 See ROBERT MELTZ & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33263, THE
WETLANDS COVERAGE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT (CWA): RAPANOS AND BEYOND 19–20 (2014)
(discussing multiple congressional proposals to revise the Rule).
19 For example, the “Clean Water Authority Restoration Act,” introduced to the 109th
Congress by Senator Russell Feingold, would have responded to the Court’s more limited
interpretation by statutorily defining the waters of the United States broadly and clarifying that
the purpose of the CWA was to prevent pollution rather than to maintain navigability. See S.
912, 109th Cong. (2005); see also MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 18, at 19 (discussing the
proposed bill); see also H.R. 2421, 110th Cong. (2007) (a similar proposed bill that would have
strengthened federal jurisdiction over waters).
20 For example, the Defense of Environment and Property Act, introduced to the 114th
Congress by Senator Rand Paul “to clarify the definition of navigable waters, and for other
purposes,” would have severely reduced federal CWA jurisdiction even beyond the Supreme
Court’s interpretation. See S. 980, 114th Cong. (2015). See generally CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R43943, EPA AND THE ARMY CORPS’ “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES” RULE:
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE AND OPTIONS (2015) (discussing legislative proposals to amend the
CWA); see also MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 18, at 19–20 (discussing the Federal Wetlands
Jurisdiction Act of 2005, which also sought to restrict federal jurisdiction).
21 See infra Part IV.
22 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054, 37,056–57.
23 See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT
SHEET CLEAN WATER RULE (2015) [hereinafter FACT SHEET], available at
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/fact_sheet_summary_final_1.pdf
(including a comparison table showing where the final rule departs from the proposed and
preexisting versions of the Rule).
24 40 C.F.R. § 110.1(3)(iii) (2016) (defining “tributaries”).
25 Id. § 110.1(1), (3)(i)–(ii) (defining “waters of the United States,” “adjacent,” and
“neighboring” as encompassing wetlands within a minimum of 100 feet of the ordinary high
water mark, or within the 100-year floodplain to a maximum of 1,500 feet above the ordinary
high water mark).
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authority.26 The Clean Water Rule also categorically excludes certain
waterways from jurisdiction, including waste treatment, stormwater, and
wastewater systems, prior converted cropland, certain artificial lakes and
ponds, groundwater, and most ditches.27 No further analysis is needed to
rebut an assertion of federal jurisdiction in these cases.28 Finally, it
establishes criteria for determining jurisdiction over waterways beyond
these categories based on their relationship to primary jurisdictional
waters.29 Nonadjacent wetlands may be federally regulated if they are shown
to have a significant connection (or “nexus”) to navigable waterways,
because their own destruction could negatively impact the chemical,
physical, or biological integrity of the larger waterways downstream.30 These
waterways will be considered jurisdictional only if the requisite nexus is
established on the basis of case-specific analysis;31 wetlands that fail the test
fall beyond federal reach.32
This articulation of the Rule responds to many of the vexing
jurisdictional questions left open by earlier judicial interventions.33 It creates,
for the first time, a set of measurable parameters for streamlining and
unifying jurisdictional determinations, constraining agency discretion on the
basis of peer-reviewed scientific consensus about the hydrological and
ecological functions of waterways.34 It attempts to moderate competing
political demands for unlimited and eviscerated jurisdictional reach.35
Nevertheless, the Clean Water Rule has not yet brought the hoped-for
regulatory closure; the Sixth Circuit stayed the Rule nationwide shortly after
it took effect, pending litigation by multiple states and other organizations in
over a dozen separate cases (arguing that the Rule both over- and underregulates).36 Wearyingly if unsurprisingly, legal uproar over the reach of the
Rule continues, and it will likely press on until the Supreme Court visits the
issue yet again.
If the Court takes the case, however, the Justices will be reviewing a
rule that responds directly to the mixed messages they sent the agencies
during the infamously fractured Rapanos decision, in which the Court split
five ways in its attempt to establish the appropriate boundaries of federal

26

Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,056.
40 C.F.R. § 110.1(2) (2016) (listing categorical exclusions).
28 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058.
29 40 C.F.R. § 110.1(3)(v) (2016).
30 Id. § 110.1(1)(vii)–(viii), (3)(v) (discussing case-specific analysis for specific kinds of
wetlands, and defining “significant nexus”); see also Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,055
(discussing jurisdiction over non-adjacent waters and wetlands).
31 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,059.
32 Id. at 37,067.
33 See discussion infra Parts II–III.
34 FACT SHEET, supra note 23 (“The rule protects waters that are next to rivers and lakes
and their tributaries because science shows that they impact downstream waters. The rule sets
boundaries on covering nearby waters for the first time that are physical and measurable.”).
35 See id. (discussing how “[t]he rule protects clean water without getting in the way of
farming, ranching, and forestry”).
36 In re U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2015).
27
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reach.37 Together with a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, Justice
Scalia’s plurality of four agreed to reject and remand the Corps’ assertion of
jurisdiction over wetlands with remote connections to navigable waters.38
However, they parted company on how the jurisdictional call should be
made on remand, with Justice Scalia suggesting that jurisdiction extend only
to wetlands with a permanent surface connection to navigable waters, and
Justice Kennedy suggesting that jurisdiction may legitimately extend to
other wetlands as well, if the government shows a significant nexus to
navigable waters on a case-by-case basis.39 Chief Justice Roberts joined in
Justice Scalia’s opinion, but wrote separately to chastise the agency for
continuing to assume overly broad authority under the statute.40 Meanwhile,
dissenting on behalf of the remaining four, Justice Stevens argued that it was
reasonable to defer to the agency’s blanket assertion of authority over like
wetlands on grounds that most will have a significant nexus with navigable
waters—so long as it is possible for a permit applicant to show why the
wetland she wants to fill lacks that nexus.41 Justice Breyer joined the dissent
but also wrote separately to emphasize that deference to the agency was
reasonable because its interpretation was the only way to accomplish the
objectives of the Act.42
Notoriously among the least helpful Supreme Court decisions of all
time, Rapanos brims with competing rationales that failed to establish
meaningful guidance for decision makers.43 While the Rapanos disarray
fueled a vortex of regulatory uncertainty for stakeholders, agencies, and the
lower courts struggling to interpret it afterward, it also sowed the seeds of
compromise in the allocation of regulatory burdens in the new Clean Water
Rule. Most notably, the Clean Water Rule capitalizes on a convergence
between the Kennedy concurrence and Stevens dissent, which create similar
substantive rules of jurisdiction, but effectively allocate the burden of proof
differently by establishing opposite presumptions in marginal cases.44
In Rapanos, Kennedy’s approach theoretically enables jurisdiction
throughout the hydrological chain so long as a significant nexus is shown,

37 Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 718 (2006) (Scalia writing for four person plurality, Roberts and
Kennedy filing separate concurrences, Stevens writing for four person dissent, Breyer filing
additional dissent).
38 Id. at 757 (plurality opinion) (vacating the judgments of the Sixth Circuit and remanding
with instructions to use a different jurisdictional standard); id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(voting with plurality to remand for use of a proper standard).
39 Id. at 757 (plurality opinion) (instructing lower courts to determine, first, whether the
ditches and drains near the wetlands in question contain a “relatively permanent flow,” and,
second, whether the wetlands possess a “continuous surface connection” with the jurisdictional
waters nearby); id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (instructing lower courts to determine
whether the lands in question had a significant “nexus” to the nearby jurisdictional waters).
40 Id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
41 Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 811–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43 Charles Duhigg & Janet Roberts, Rulings Restrict Clean Water Act, Foiling E.P.A., N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/01/us/01water.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2016).
44 See infra Part IV.
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but it puts the burden of establishing nexus for nonadjacent wetlands on the
agency.45 This can be very expensive for the agency, and on balance, is likely
to result in less regulation (affirmed in the wake of Rapanos, when the
United States gave up on thousands of enforcement actions rather than
invest scarce agency resources in trying to prove jurisdiction).46 Meanwhile,
Stevens’s dissent would also allow far-flung jurisdiction on the same
scientific premise47—but it assumes significant nexus throughout the
hydrological chain, in deference to the agency’s interpretation of what is
needed to effectuate CWA statutory goals.48 Still, it allows the landowner to
effectively rebut the presumption of significant nexus in marginal cases,
putting the burden on the landowner to show why a given wetland should
not be jurisdictional for lack of nexus (at which point, the agency would
cede its jurisdictional entitlement to the landowner by granting the permit).49
Of course, this can be expensive for a landowner, and all else equal, would
probably result in less wetland filling.50 The two approaches are thus mirror
opposites of one another at the level of regulatory architecture, symmetrical
in substance but for the small detail of who will bear the burden of proof.
The Clean Water Rule effectively splits the difference between these
two approaches—categorially extending jurisdiction throughout much of the

45 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When the Corps seeks to
regulate wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, it may rely on adjacency to establish its
jurisdiction. Absent more specific regulations, however, the Corps must establish a significant
nexus on a case-by-case basis when it seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to
nonnavigable tributaries.” (emphasis added)).
46 See Duhigg & Roberts, supra note 43 (“Companies that have spilled oil, carcinogens and
dangerous bacteria into lakes, rivers and other waters are not being prosecuted, according to
Environmental Protection Agency regulators working on those cases, who estimate that more
than 1,500 major pollution investigations have been discontinued or shelved in the last four
years.”).
47 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Corps’ exercise of
jurisdiction is reasonable even though not every wetland adjacent to a traditionally navigable
water or its tributary will perform all (or perhaps any) of the water quality functions generally
associated with wetlands. . . . Instead, it is enough that wetlands adjacent to tributaries
generally have a significant nexus to the watershed’s water quality.”).
48 See id. at 809.
49 See id. at 797 (“If a particular wetland is ‘not significantly intertwined with the ecosystem
of adjacent waterways,’ then the Corps may allow its development ‘simply by issuing a
permit.’”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-297, WATERS AND WETLANDS: CORPS
OF ENGINEERS NEEDS TO EVALUATE ITS DISTRICT OFFICE PRACTICES IN DETERMINING JURISDICTION
8 (2004) (“The Corps approves virtually all section 404 permit applications. In fiscal year 2002,
for example, of 85,445 section 404 permit applications filed, the Corps denied 128 and 4,143
were withdrawn by the applicant.”). See also infra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing
my use of the vocabulary of legal entitlements in jurisdictional contexts like this one).
50 See David Sunding & David Zilberman, The Economics of Environmental Regulation by
Licensing: An Assessment of Recent Changes to the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 59, 74 (2002) (“The mean individual permit application in our sample costs over
$271,596 to prepare (ignoring the cost of mitigation, design changes, costs of carrying capital,
and other costs), while the cost of preparing a nationwide permit application averages
$28,915.”).
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hydrological chain (as Stevens advocated),51 but using case-specific analysis
for most nonadjacent wetlands (as Kennedy advocated).52 In this way, there
is something for everyone to like—or hate—in different parts of the rule.
Neither landowners nor agencies can rest on a plenary regulatory
entitlement while the other side bears all responsibility for establishing
jurisdiction or the lack thereof. Critically, while the Kennedy and Stevens
rules of jurisdiction are theoretically similar, their differing presumptions
bear enormous significance for actual governance (because the reality of
resource constraints means that there will likely be more regulation under
the Stevens approach, and less under Kennedy’s approach).53 Here too, the
new Rule splits the difference in a way that sensibly honors the competing
considerations—privileging federal jurisdiction in circumstances where
harm is most likely, and protecting state and private autonomy where the
nation’s waters are least clearly at risk.
By incorporating alternating defaults, the Clean Water Rule thus seeks
the most logical middle path between them—striving for a workable
regulatory compromise, and highlighting how sophisticated legal
architecture can create improbable common ground from seemingly
irreconcilable political dissensus. While it may not be the best overall rule
from any single perspective within the debate, it capitalizes on the best
possible common ground among them, including elements from the other
Justices’ views in Rapanos as well. Intriguingly, this analysis also shows how
the debate over the federalism implications of the Rule is giving way to a
debate over the regulatory architecture of the Rule. By incorporating both
the Stevens and Kennedy approaches (and nodding to recommendations by
the others),54 the Clean Water Rule suggests that the substantive rule of
jurisdiction may no longer be the primary obstacle for a majority of the
Court, which shifts instead to identifying who must show when that
jurisdictional standard has been met. Although followers of Justice Scalia’s
perspective in Rapanos may remain unpersuaded, recognizing this key point
may help defuse some of the most divisive struggles over defining the waters

51 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,073 (June 29, 2015) (“The agencies define
‘waters of the United States’ in paragraph (a) of the rule for all sections of the CWA to include
the traditional navigable waters (a)(1), interstate waters (a)(2), the territorial seas (a)(3),
impoundments of jurisdictional waters (a)(4), covered tributaries (a)(5), and covered adjacent
waters (a)(6). Waters in these categories are jurisdictional ‘waters of the United States’ by
rule—no additional analysis is required. This eliminates the need to make a case-specific
significant nexus determination for covered tributaries or covered adjacent waters because the
agencies determined that these waters have a significant nexus to waters identified in (a)(1)
through (a)(3) of the rule and thus are ‘waters of the United States.’”). See also Rapanos, 547
U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52 See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073 (“In addition to waters that are categorically
‘waters of the United States’ or categorically excluded under paragraphs (a) and (b), the rule
identifies certain waters that can be ‘waters of the United States’ only where a case-specific
determination has found a significant nexus between the water and traditional navigable
waters, interstate waters, or the territorial seas.”). See also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
53 See Sunding & Zilberman, supra note 50, at 74.
54 See infra notes 219, 234–237 and accompanying text.
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of the United States, focusing our collective energy in more productive
directions.
Part II reviews the early history of wetlands regulation under the Clean
Water Act and the development of the Rule through key iterations of
Supreme Court review, including United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes
(Riverside Bayview Homes)55 and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cooke
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC).56 Part III analyzes the
Supreme Court’s aggressively split decision in Rapanos, and how it
proverbially (if not literally) muddied the water of wetlands regulation
afterward. Part IV explores the new Clean Water Rule as a response to
Rapanos, showing how the new version of the Rule exploits an unlikely
thread of continuity between its multiple opinions. It concludes that for that
reason, and for the wisdom of its politically necessary compromise, the Rule
warrants both deference and respect.
II. THE CWA AND THE “WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES”
Enacted in 1972 by a large bipartisan majority in Congress,57 the CWA
seeks to restore and maintain the quality of the nation’s waters by regulating
the discharge of pollutants into jurisdictional waterways.58 The goal of the
statute was to make the nation’s waters fishable, swimmable, and drinkable
by 1983.59 Congress had stepped into a field formerly regulated by the states
because the collective action problems involved in regulating the public
water commons had failed to protect them from excessive pollution.60
Nevertheless, Congress instructed EPA to work closely with the states in
designing a program of cooperative federalism—one that would reap the
comparative advantages of national technical expertise in helping to
establish appropriate standards and local enforcement expertise in
designing appropriate means of implementation.61
The primary tools for regulating water pollution under the Act include
the establishment of: 1) discharge standards, limiting the total discharge of
regulated pollutants into impaired waterways through established “total
55

474 U.S. 121 (1985).
531 U.S. 159 (2001).
57 See Bonnie Stewart et al., Clean Water Act’s Anti-Pollution Goals Prove Elusive, OR. PUB.
BROAD., July 17, 2012, http://www.opb.org/news/article/anti-pollution-goals-elude-clean-wateract-enforce/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (noting that the Act was passed 40 years ago by a large,
bipartisan majority of Congress).
58 CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2012) (“The objective of this chapter is to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters. In order to
achieve this objective it is hereby declared that . . . it is the national goal that the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985.”).
59 See id. § 1251(a)(2) (“[I]t is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of
water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife
and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by . . . 1983.”).
60 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, in THE LAW AND
POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 355, 364–65 (Kaylani Robins
ed., 2016).
61 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
56
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maximum daily loads” (TMDLs);62 2) performance standards, including the
“best practicable control technology currently available;”63 and 3) the section
402 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), which
prohibits discharges of pollutants from a “point source” into regulated
waters without a permit.64 The NPDES program regulated end-of-pipe water
pollution in two phases, beginning with the Phase I effort to regulate
pollution by the largest dischargers (including industrial and large municipal
sources), followed by the Phase II program to regulate stormwater pollution
discharged by small and medium-sized municipal storm sewers.65 Though
EPA oversees the NPDES program, states can choose to self-implement the
permitting program, and all but four states have accepted this delegation of
national authority.66
While the statutory language of the CWA is seemingly straightforward,
Congress left many details for later interpretation by the implementing
agencies.67 A particularly vexing question has been how far up the
hydrological chain federal authority under the Act should extend, especially
over diffuse wetlands and intermittent tributaries. The following Sections
outline the regulatory guidance the agencies have promulgated to facilitate
implementation of the Act in this regard, and the Court’s efforts to interpret
them over time.

A. Wetlands Regulation Under the CWA
The CWA and its implementing rules have interpreted “pollutants”
broadly to include anything that would threaten the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the nation’s waters—including heat from industrial
sources and power plants and sediments from construction and other
activities.68 Sediments used to fill wetlands are specially regulated under
section 404 of the Act, because unimpaired wetlands play an important
natural role in helping to purify pollutants before they enter critical
62

See id. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
See id. § 1314(b)(1)(A).
64 See id. § 1311; see also id. § 1342.
65 See id. § 1342(p)(4) (authorizing the “Phase I” and “Phase II” Stormwater Rules); EPA
OFFICE OF WATER, STORMWATER PHASE II FINAL RULE: FACT SHEET 2.1, at 2 (2005), available at
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/fact2-1.pdf (discussing the Phase II Rule); id. at 3 (discussing
63

the conferral of municipal discretion under the general permit system); Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 344 F.3d 832, 845–46, 846 n.20 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the Phase II Rule’s
regulation of construction site sedimentation).
66 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (authorizing state permit programs); see also Ryan, supra note
60, at 405 (“[N]early all states have chosen to administer their own permitting programs, in
order to maximize regulatory autonomy in managing in-state water resources and economic
development.”);
U.S.
Envtl.
Prot.
Agency,
NPDES
Program
Authorizations,
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-10/documents/state_npdes_program_status.pdf
(last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (noting that the four unauthorized states are Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, and Idaho).
67 See, e.g., Am. Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2001) (“EPA has been
charged by Congress with the authority to administer and interpret the Act.”).
68 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2012) (defining “pollutant”); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2015) (defining
“pollutant”).
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waterways.69 While EPA oversees the enforcement of section 402, the
regulation of wetland filling under section 404 is overseen by the Corps.70
Section 404 prohibits the filling of jurisdictional wetlands, but it allows
exceptions by permit according to the following policies: the agency must
seek to avoid filling jurisdictional wetlands, but may issue permits when
filling is unavoidable if impacts are mitigated and compensatory mitigation
is provided for any resulting harm.71
Wetlands perform a host of valuable ecosystem services ranging from
water filtration, flood protection, storm surge buffering, fish nursery, and
others—but they confer little economic value directly to their owners in
their natural state.72 By contrast, when these hydric soils are filled and
hardened to provide support for structures, they provide valuable
opportunities for agricultural use or to construct surface structures, often on
lucrative waterfront real estate.73 Indeed, before wetland values were fully
recognized, the U.S. government encouraged the filling of wetlands through
the early Swamp Land Acts74 of the nineteenth century, and other programs
seeking to make them more valuable for economic development.75 As a
result of these policies and the unregulated progress of the real estate
market, about half of the nation’s wetlands have already been lost to fill—
and up to 95% in places like San Francisco.76
Once filled, wetlands can no longer perform their natural functions, and
adjacent communities have suffered the consequences—as demonstrated
most palpably in the flooding of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, the
dead-zones in Chesapeake Bay and the Gulf of Mexico due to unfiltered
water pollution, and other high profile examples.77 An Illinois study
demonstrated the importance of wetlands to regulating flooding and overall
ecological function in a stream corridor, finding that every 1% increase in
wetlands reduced peak flows by 3.7%.78 In the 1980s, increasing recognition
69 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (requiring permits for disposal of dredged or fill material); see
also 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b) (2015) (directing the Corps to consider the effect of fill material on

wetlands and the important role they play when determining whether to issue a section 404
permit).
70 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d).
71 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WETLAND REGULATORY AUTHORITY (2004), available at
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-03/documents/404_reg_authority_fact_sheet.pdf.
72 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FUNCTIONS AND VALUES OF WETLANDS (2001), available at
http://www.wayneswcd.org/Education/wetland%20valuefunction.pdf; NICHOLAS A. ASHFORD &
CHARLES C. CALDART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS: RECLAIMING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL AGENDA 672 (2008).
73 ASHFORD & CALDART, supra note 72, at 672.
74 Swamp Land Act of 1850, 43 U.S.C. §§ 981–984 (2012).
75 JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 119 (2d ed. 2009).
76 Id. at 852; Peter Goodwin et al., Tidal Wetland Restoration: An Introduction, 27 J. OF
COASTAL RES. 1, 1 (2001).
77 See generally Erin Ryan, New Orleans, the Chesapeake, and the Future of Environmental
Assessment: Overcoming the Natural Resources Law of Unintended Consequences, 40 U. RICH.
L. REV. 981, 982 (2006) (discussing the unintended consequences of natural resource planning
and assessment).
78 See James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and the
Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309, 319 (2001).
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of the devastating consequences of wetland loss prompted President George
H.W. Bush to declare a national policy of preventing further loss of wetland
resources (the “No Net Loss” declaration).79
Ideally, CWA section 404 is designed to forestall the further degradation
of wetlands on which the nation’s waterways depend for the very chemical,
physical, and biological integrity that the statute was enacted to protect.
However, the question of exactly which wetlands are subject to federal
regulation under the CWA has produced a long and vigorous debate.80 The
statute itself refers only to navigable waters,81 but it has long been
understood that the health of navigable waters at the bottom of the
watershed depends on the intact wetlands higher in the hydrological chain.82
But which wetlands? All of them? A specified subset?
Indeed, it has not always been easy to establish what should even count
as a wetland for CWA purposes.83 The technical definition of wetland refers
to an area with hydric soils adapted for underwater vegetation growth,
which encompasses even ephemeral waterways during the dry season.84 Yet
the same prairie potholes that look like shallow ponds in the wet season
seem more like open fields during the dry season. Still, for the purpose of
interpreting the CWA, the ultimate question is not what counts as a wetland
in the abstract, but what counts as a “jurisdictional” wetland, or one subject
to federal regulation under the Act.
In 1974, the Corps issued regulations defining the reference to
“navigable waters” in the Clean Water Act as encompassing “those waters of
the United States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or
are presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible
for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.”85 However, this
definition left for later clarification the ambiguous term, “waters of the
United States.” In 1977, the Corps issued additional regulations—regulations
that would become known as the “Waters of the United States Rule”86—
defining the waters of the United States to include “isolated wetlands and

79

See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 75, at 852–53.
See, e.g., Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985); SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167
(2001); Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006) (plurality opinion).
81 See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2012) (prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into
80

“navigable waters”).
82 E.g., Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 134–35 (finding Corps’ conclusion that
adjacent wetlands serve significant biological functions for traditionally navigable waters is
reasonable).
83 Id. at 132–33.
84 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(c)(4) (2015); Tiner, supra note 11 (explaining that the term “wetlands”
refers primarily to nonnavigable hydric soils that are “wet for some period of time, but not
necessarily permanently wet”).
85 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974).
86 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR THE CLEAN WATER RULE:
DEFINITION OF WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES 21
(2015),
available at
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/technical_support_document_for
_the_clean_water_rule_1.pdf [hereinafter TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT] (noting that “[t]he
Corps’ current regulation contains similar language . . . and EPA has promulgated regulations
that include a substantially identical definition” to the Corps’ 1977 regulations).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2758982

6_TOJCI.RYAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

8/20/2016 1:35 PM

FEDERALISM, REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE

289

lakes, intermittent streams, prairie potholes, and other waters that are not
part of a tributary system to interstate waters or to navigable waters of the
United States, the degradation or destruction of which would affect
interstate commerce.”87
With that definition in mind, then, which wetlands should be subject to
CWA section 404? To be sure, there are easy calls—distinct geographical
features like rivers and lakes are usually jurisdictional, especially if they are
large enough to be navigable.88 Then there are those wetlands that may not
themselves be navigable in fact, but that have permanent standing
connections to waterways that are—such as adjacent ponds, riparian and
coastal marshlands, and nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters.89
These, too, have proved relatively uncontroversial.90 But there are also the
many harder calls, such as seasonal and ephemeral wetlands that dry out for
parts of the year, manmade ditches that can convey pollutants into navigable
waterways, wetlands separated from navigable waterways by artificial
berms, and those with underground hydrological connections to navigable
waters.91 And there are also waters that may be hydrologically isolated from
those that are “navigable in fact,” but may have other kinds of ecological
connections, such as those jointly composing a habitat corridor for various
forms of wildlife.92 The following discussion reviews the history of the
Supreme Court’s treatment of these questions.

B. Riverside Bayview Homes and Significant Nexus
The breadth of the Rule was first challenged at the Supreme Court by a
Michigan developer who was denied a section 404 permit to fill lakeside
marshes.93 In Riverside Bayview Homes, the plaintiff challenged federal
authority over wetlands that were not navigable in fact, arguing that since
the CWA itself used the word navigable, the nonnavigable marshes at issue
could not be subject to the Act.94 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the
waters of the United States, as clarified by agency regulations, reasonably

87

33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(5) (1978).

88

See Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 730–33 (2006) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 731.
See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 134–35 (2001) (discussing the

89
90

reasonableness of extending jurisdiction to wetlands adjacent to navigable water).
91 Compare Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732–34, 742 (plurality opinion) (holding that only those
waters that have “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water” can be considered
“waters of the United States”), with id. at 805–06 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of
extending jurisdiction to all adjacent waters on the grounds that they are likely to have a
significant nexus with nearby navigable waters).
92 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167–68 (2001) (declining to extend Corps’ CWA jurisdiction
to waters that are completely hydrologically isolated from navigable waters, but noting that
jurisdiction may extend to a water so long as it has a “significant nexus” to “navigable waters,”
perhaps implying an ecological nexus of habitat function).
93 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 124.
94 Brief for Respondent, Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (No. 84-701), 1985
WL 669797, at *30–*31 (arguing that “‘[w]etlands’ have never been classified as navigable waters
in their own right”).
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included nonnavigable wetlands with a significant nexus to waters that were
navigable in fact.95 Deferring to Congress’s long acquiescence to the Corps’
assertion of this sort of jurisdiction, the Court concluded that the language,
history, and policy of the Act all made clear that the statute was enacted to
protect water quality, and it was thus reasonable for the agency to define the
waters of the United States by reference to water quality functions—
including the filtration, flood retention, and habitat functions associated
with wetlands.96 As wetlands loss would threaten water quality, they were
reasonably encompassed by the Rule.97
Riverside Bayview Homes therefore held that, at a minimum, wetlands
were jurisdictional if they were adjacent to navigable in fact waters.98 But
what about wetlands with a nonadjacent nexus? What about nonnavigable
waters whose connections to navigable waters were of the biological sort,
rather than the direct hydrological sort—for example, those that do not
share water with navigable waterways, but that form part of a wildlife
habitat corridor? The Corps attempted to resolve this issue by promulgating
new regulations in 1986, clarifying the 1977 interpretation of the waters of
the United States.99 In the later rule, the Corps clarified that section 404
jurisdiction also extended to any interstate waters that were or would be: 1)
used as habitat by migratory birds protected by treaties; 2) used as habitat
by other migratory birds that cross state lines; 3) used as habitat for
endangered species; or 4) used to irrigate crops sold in interstate
commerce.100
The earlier regulations had implicitly drawn on available federal
authority conferred by the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, specifically in
reference to the prong of the Commerce Clause that confers federal
authority over the channels of interstate commerce—as are navigable
waterways.101 The new Rule sought to take advantage of the full scope of
available federal authority to regulate wetlands, not only by virtue of their
connections to the channels of interstate commerce, but also under other
constitutionally enumerated federal powers.
For example, the provision asserting jurisdiction over waters used as
habitat by migratory birds drew on the Treaty Clause,102 which confers
federal authority to implement the terms of international treaties, such as
the Migratory Bird Treaty of 1918,103 by which the United States and England

95
96
97
98

Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133–35, 138.
Id. at 134–35.
Id.
Id. at 135, 139.

99 Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206,
41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
100

Id.
See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 123 (noting that the Corps “initially
constru[ed] the Act to cover only waters navigable in fact”); see also The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
101

557, 558 (1870) (noting that waters are “navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible
of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce”)
102 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
103 See, e.g., Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2012).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2758982

6_TOJCI.RYAN (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

8/20/2016 1:35 PM

FEDERALISM, REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE

291

(acting on behalf of Canada) agreed to protect migratory birds in which all
signatories held an interest. The second provision asserted jurisdiction over
migratory birds not covered by the treaty and other species that cross state
lines, asserting a federal interest in wildlife as a fugitive interstate resource
not confined to the law of any one state (and potentially also of federal
interest under the Commerce Clause).104 The third provision ties these
waters to federal authority under the Endangered Species Act,105 drawing
constitutional authority from other parts of the Commerce Clause, treating
species as instrumentalities in interstate commerce (and the commercial
interests in preserving them as activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce).106 The fourth provision extends jurisdiction to
wetlands irrigating crops sold in interstate commerce on grounds that they
thereby have a substantial relationship to interstate commerce.107

C. SWANCC and Hydrologically Isolated Wetlands
The breadth of these assertions were challenged in the next Supreme
Court case to wrestle with the problem, Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers—more commonly known as
SWANCC.108 In this case, Northern Cook County (the County) had planned to
fill several ponds that had formed at the site of an abandoned gravel mine
for use as a landfill.109 When gravel mines are hollowed out to form a cavity, a
new local watershed can form, as tributaries that once emptied into a
downstream basin are intercepted by the new impermeable cavity.110 Over
time, these cavities commonly fill with water to create new wetland
ecosystems, providing habitat for species often pressed out of previous
wetland areas by development.111 Abandoned gravel mines providing wetland
habitat have created new habitat and recreational sites, such as the Galster
Pit Mine in New York State, which saw the transformation of a devastated
abandoned mine brownfield into a thriving new ecosystem.112
It was on this basis that the Corps denied the County’s application for a
permit to fill the ponds.113 The Corps could not assert jurisdiction over the

104

E.g., Wild Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2012).

105

Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).

106

See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492 (2000) (finding it reasonable for Congress to

regulate endangered species under the Commerce Clause because the species implicate
commercial activities and interstate markets).
107 Carey Schmidt, Private Wetlands and Public Values: “Navigable Waters” and the
Significant Nexus Test Under the Clean Water Act, 26 PUB. LAND AND RESOURCES L. REV. 97, 102–
03, 117 (2005).
108 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
109 Id. at 163.
110 William H. Brown, When Worlds Collide—The Gravel Pit Evaporation Conflict, 18 COLO.
LAW. 207, 237 (1964).
111 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SAND AND GRAVEL PITS AS FISH AND WILDLIFE HABITAT IN THE
SOUTHWEST 1 (1988).
112 N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl Conservation, National Mine Reclamation Award: 1995 Award
for New York Gravel Mine, http://www.dec.ny.gov/lands/5368.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
113 SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 165.
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wetlands in question on the basis that they were navigable, nor because they
were adjacent to a navigable waterway. An abandoned rock-bottomed gravel
mine is, almost by definition, unconnected to downstream waters, because
these waterways are not even bridged by a subterranean groundwater
connection, as many other surface waters are. The sole basis for CWA
jurisdiction in this case was the presence of migratory birds on the ponds,
and the plaintiff challenged this as a legitimate basis for extending
regulatory authority under the CWA.114
The issue in SWANCC was therefore straightforward: could the Army
Corps exercise jurisdiction over hydrologically isolated wetlands on this
basis?115 However, the case itself was argued on two different levels: the
statutory interpretation level (did Congress actually intend to exercise this
much federal jurisdiction?), and the constitutional level (even if it wanted to,
could Congress have exercised this much jurisdiction, consistent with
constitutional limits on federal authority?).116 Even though the statutory
question was the primary issue before the Court, its treatment on all sides
was suffused with anxiety about the implications of the statutory issue for
the constitutional question, and of the constitutional question for the
statutory issue.
The Supreme Court ultimately resolved the question solely on statutory
interpretation grounds, holding that Congress did not mean to regulate
hydrologically isolated wetlands based on the presence of migratory birds
(although failing to fully engage the questions of whether Congress could
have done so on the basis of the other available sources of authority, such as
that conferred by the Treaty Clause).117 The Court held that the statute itself
was insufficiently clear on this point, and if the statute were not perfectly
clear, then the Court would not defer to an agency’s interpretation that
pushes to the limits of its constitutional authority.118 Articulating this “clear
statement rule,” the Court clarified that in such a circumstance, Congress
must make a clear statement of its intent to push that far, removing any
uncertainty for judicial review.119
The Court’s decision in SWANCC thus invalidated the Migratory Bird
Rule and effectively threw the scope of federal CWA jurisdiction into
disarray.120 A circuit split emerged as the lower courts struggled to reconcile
SWANCC ’s jurisdiction-limiting principle with the longstanding scope of
federal authority previously exercised under the CWA. The Fifth Circuit
adopted a more limited approach to federal wetlands jurisdiction, but the
other six circuits that heard relevant challenges between SWANCC and
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 165–66.
Id. at 162.
Id.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.

120 United States v. Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006) (indicating that SWANCC
“struck down the migratory bird rule”); Erin R. Flanagan, It’s the “Supreme Law of the Land:”

Using the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Protect Isolated Wetlands Left High and Dry by
SWANCC, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 176–77 (2005).
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Rapanos continued to uphold jurisdiction throughout the full tributary
system, including wetlands with only intermittent connections to navigable
waterways, artificial tributaries, and those with only subsurface and
ecological connections.121 Some observers compared the actions of these six
circuits to nullification—or at least open disregard for the Supreme Court’s
warnings about jurisdictional overreach in SWANCC (although none of them
directly contradicted its holding disallowing jurisdiction over hydrologically
isolated gravel mines).122 SWANCC did not, however, overrule Riverside
Bayview Homes’s rule that wetlands with a significant nexus to waters that
were navigable in fact would be treated as jurisdictional.123
At this point, then, it was clear that adjacent wetlands with a significant
nexus to navigable waters would be considered jurisdictional, at least
according to the operative Supreme Court precedent, and isolated wetlands
with a mere ecological nexus to navigable waters would not be.124 Still, the
open question that paralyzed CWA enforcement after that remained
unanswered: What about non-adjacent wetlands with a hydrological
nexus?125 After SWANCC, it was clear that nonadjacent wetlands that are
physically (and thus hydrologically) isolated, like the gravel mine ponds, will
never make the jurisdictional cut. But what about wetlands that are not
adjacent to navigable rivers, lakes, or coastlines, but that still share some
kind of significant hydrological connection?
What if a connection is present but remote—say, if the wetlands are
connected to navigable waters by twenty miles of nonnavigable creeks?
What about wetlands that are connected by an artificial drainage ditch—like
an agricultural irrigation ditch or a municipal stormwater ditch? What about
wetlands that are close, but separated from navigable waters by an artificial

121 Compare In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2003), and Rice v. Harken
Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 2001), with Hubenka, 438 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 157 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447
(6th Cir. 2003); Treacy v. Newdunn Assoc., LLP, 344 F.3d 407, 416–17 (4th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Krilich, 303 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2002); Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d
526, 534 (9th Cir. 2001). Indeed, in Rice, the Fifth Circuit expanded on the jurisdiction-limiting
principle of SWANCC to curtail federal jurisdiction under the Oil Pollution Act. Rice, 250 F.3d at
269.
122 See Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act after SWANCC: Using a
Hydrological Connection Approach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 811, 820–21
(2003) (observing that a majority of lower courts interpreted SWANCC as having a narrow
impact on jurisdictional questions, and noting that their “loose approach to defining a
hydrological connection ignores SWANCC’s requirement of a significant nexus”); Jeremy A.
Colby, SWANCC: Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing. . .Much? 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
1017, 1018 (2004) (discussing the circuit split in interpreting SWANCC and arguing that the
looser interpretation adopted by the majority of circuits undermines the force of the
jurisdiction-limiting principle of SWANCC).
123 See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 172 (discussing Riverside Bayview Homes and
reaffirming that nonnavigable wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters are
jurisdictional).
124 Id. at 165–68, 170–71.
125 See id. at 167 (discussing the absence of opinion in Riverside Bayview Homes regarding
jurisdiction over non-adjacent wetlands, and leaving the issue open as to the authority of the
Corps to regulate non-adjacent wetlands with a hydrological nexus).
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berm? What about hydrological connections that are entirely subsurface,
through groundwater exchange? And what about ephemeral or intermittent
waterways? Since 59% of all stream miles in the lower 48 states are
ephemeral—as are 95% of all stream miles in the arid West—the decision to
assign them as jurisdictional or not would have enormous consequences.126 It
was in the midst of this great uncertainty that the Rapanos case was heard.
III. THE SUPREME COURT MUDDIES THE WATER IN RAPANOS
In 1989, and despite regulatory warnings from the Corps that it would
violate section 404, John Rapanos filled fifty-four acres of ephemerally
saturated soils that were eleven to twenty miles from navigable waters, but
connected to those waters by various ditches and streams.127 June Carabell
filled wetlands that were separated from jurisdictional waters by a four-foot
wide artificial berm, similarly after warnings and without a permit.128 When
the government initiated enforcement actions against both landowners, the
landowners separately sued on grounds that the federal government lacked
jurisdiction over these wetlands.129 The question in both cases was simple:
were these waters of the United States for the purposes of the CWA?130
The cases were consolidated and ultimately decided by the Supreme
Court, in what would ultimately prove one of the Court’s most fractured
decisions of all time.131 The Court produced five different opinions without a
clear majority view, remanding the case for further proceedings but without
a clear standard to apply.132 The following Sections describe the various
opinions reached by different members of the Court.

A. Judicial Disarray in Rapanos
Writing for a plurality of four, Justice Scalia concluded that jurisdiction
was lacking, because it should cover only those permanent, standing,
continuously flowing bodies of water forming geographically cognizable
features that have direct surface connections to navigable waters.133 By his
analysis, hydrological connection alone is never enough to establish federal
jurisdiction.134 Nonadjacent wetlands, those that are intermittent, and those

126 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 86, at 143; James Murphy, Hard to Navigate:
Rapanos and the Future of Protecting Our Waters, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2007, at 4.
127 Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 719–20 (2006) (plurality opinion).
128 Id. at 730.
129 Id. at 729–30.
130 Id. at 729.
131 Murphy, supra note 126, at 3–4; Joshua A. Bloom, What’s Next After Rapanos?, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2007, at 14.
132 Murphy, supra note 126, at 4.
133 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (plurality opinion).
134 Id. at 742 (“Thus, establishing that wetlands such as those at the Rapanos and Carabell
sites are covered by the Act requires two findings: first, that the adjacent channel contains a
‘wate[r] of the United States,’ (i.e., a relatively permanent body of water connected to
traditional interstate navigable waters); and second, that the wetland has a continuous surface
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with hydrological connections that are physically remote from navigable in
fact waters cannot be said to have a significant nexus, he reasoned, and so
they cannot satisfy the Riverside Bayview Homes requirement.135 He chided
the Corps’ definition for encroaching too far on local land use authority and
for straying too far from the dictionary definition of the common words
involved—likening the agency’s “Land Is Waters” interpretation to
“parody.”136 On remand, he indicated that the agency should find jurisdiction
only if 1) the adjacent body is traditionally navigable or 2) it is joined by a
continuous surface connection so that the boundary between the two is hard
to locate.137 Chief Justice Roberts joined the plurality, but concurred
separately to emphasize his disappointment that the agency had not heeded
SWANNC ’s invitation to take a humbler view of the extent of its CWA
authority.138
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, writing separately to
indicate his alternative reasoning.139 In his view, a more remote hydrological
connection isn’t necessarily enough to establish jurisdiction, but it might
be—if the agency proves it is enough to establish the significant nexus
required by Riverside Bayview Homes.140 SWANCC overturned the Migratory
Bird Rule, he explained, but it affirmed the significant nexus test:
jurisdiction exists if destruction of the wetland would significantly affect the
physical, biological, or chemical integrity of the nation’s waters.141 If it does
so alone or cumulatively, an ecological connection to navigable waters might
suffice (such as providing water filtration services), even if it is not a
continuous surface connection of the sort Justice Scalia’s plurality would
require.142 He would allow a presumption of nexus if the wetland is directly
adjacent to a navigable waterway or is a major tributary, but if the tributary
is minor, intermittent, or ephemeral, then case-by-case findings are required
to examine whether the significant nexus is present.143 In his view, case-bycase evaluation was necessary to avoid overbreadth of the agency rule, as
some will fail the connection (as in SWANCC).144 But sometimes, even a
marginal connection will pass the test.145 Here, the record contained
evidence suggesting a possible nexus, so Justice Kennedy voted to remand
to make that determination.146
connection with that water, making it difficult to determine where the “water” ends and the
‘wetland’ begins.”).
135 Id. at 740–42.
136 Id. at 732–34.
137 Id. at 757.
138 Id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
139 Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
140 See id. at 781–82 (basing the jurisdictional question on the significant nexus between
waters rather than merely the presence or absence of a hydrological connection).
141 Id. at 766–67, 780.
142 Id. at 772, 779–80 (indicating concerns with adjacency to traditionally navigable waters,
but excluding any requirement of a continuous surface connection).
143 Id. at 781–82.
144
145
146

Id.
Id.
Id. at 783.
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Justice Stevens dissented for the remaining four members of the court,
who were all willing to defer to the agency’s stated rule as reasonable, on
grounds that jurisdiction does not depend on a surface connection.147 He
argued that Riverside Bayview Homes controls, and nothing in that opinion
suggests that jurisdiction requires a continuous surface connection.148 A
purely hydrological or ecological connection might suffice to establish a
significant nexus under Riverside Bayview Homes.149 The plurality’s reliance
on SWANCC was misplaced, he explained, because these cases were not
about hydrologically isolated wetlands—they simply involved wetlands that
were not directly adjacent to navigable waters.150 Moreover, he reasoned that
even if not every wetland has a significant nexus to navigable waters, if most
of them do, then it is reasonable for the agency to assert jurisdiction over all
of them, while using the permitting program to facilitate the appropriate
exceptions.151 By his reasoning, the agency could legitimately create a
rebuttable presumption of general jurisdiction over wetlands that could be
waived by individual permit application.152 If the agency were convinced by
the permittee’s showing that these wetlands would not have a significant
nexus, then it could effectively waive its jurisdictional entitlement (or at
least the section 404 prohibition on filling wetlands) by granting the permit
and allowing fill.153 Justice Stevens would have deferred to Congress’s
acquiescence and upheld the regulations as they had been applied for
decades, and he warned that the Court should not overturn thirty years of
combined executive and legislative implementation.154
Justice Breyer joined in Justice Stevens’s dissent, but he also wrote
separately to emphasize his understanding about the relationship of the
challenged rule to Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the CWA:
protecting the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s
waters.155 He noted that federal authority under the Commerce Clause easily
extends to wetlands, and that the Court should defer to the agency’s
interpretation because the waters of the United States are so intricately
connected that Congress could have, and probably did, mean exactly this
interpretation.156 By his analysis, if broadly defining jurisdiction is critical to
accomplishing Congress’s clearly stated statutory goals, and this
interpretation is really the only way to accomplish those goals, then that
147 Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting Justice Scalia’s reasoning because it
disregards the “technical and complex character” of the agency’s duty to preserve the quality of
the nation’s waters).
148 Id. at 792–93.
149 Id. at 797.
150 Id. at 794–95.
151 Id. at 797–98.
152
153

Id.
Id. Note that section 404 permits are granted for other reasons in addition to lack of

nexus, including circumstances in which filling a jurisdictional wetland is unavoidable for an
important purpose but remediable by mitigation. See supra note 69–71 and accompanying text
(discussing circumstances in which permits to fill are granted).
154 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 799.
155 Id. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
156

Id.
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alone should suffice for the significant nexus.157 He recommended that the
federal agencies implementing the rule should rewrite the regulations to say
this even more clearly, because then this interpretation would also warrant
Chevron158 deference.159
In his dissent, Justice Stevens also noted that although Justice Kennedy
provided the fifth vote to remand, his reasoning was not in harmony with
that of the plurality opinion.160 Instead, Justice Kennedy’s reasoning was the
narrowest reasoning on which five members of the Court could agree, since
it was reasoning that the four justices in Justice Stevens’s concurrence could
at least agree with, even though they would have taken the reasoning a few
steps further.161 As such, he noted, it should be the precedential rule of the
case.162 Indeed, uncertain of which rule should prevail, in one of the first
appellate cases to test the ramifications of Rapanos, the First Circuit held in
United States v. Johnson163 that jurisdiction exists if the agency can meet
either the Scalia or the Kennedy tests for jurisdiction, and the Supreme
Court denied review.164

B. Wetlands Regulation After Rapanos
The relentless judicial dissensus in Rapanos set in motion a period of
intense regulatory confusion among later decision makers struggling to
interpret the reach of federal wetlands authority. After the court’s ruling, it
remained clear that any traditionally navigable waters would be
jurisdictional, including those considered navigable in fact at present, in the
past, or in the nonspeculatively foreseeable future.165 Those with an
unbroken surface connection to navigable waters were still jurisdictional.166
And those whose use or degradation would directly affect interstate or
foreign commerce would be jurisdictional—such as those used for fishery,
recreational, and industrial purposes.167 But all others—ephemeral wetlands,
nonadjacent wetlands, artificially joined and separated wetlands, etc.—
remained uncertain, with differing answers depending on which Supreme

157 Id. (rejecting the addition of another “nexus” requirement outside what Congress and the
agency establish as sufficient).
158 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
159 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161 Id.; see also United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724 (7th Cir. 2006)
(treating Justice Kennedy’s test as controlling after Rapanos as “the narrowest ground to which
a majority of the Justices would have assented if forced to choose”).
162 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006).
164 Id. at 60 (finding a cranberry farm to be a jurisdictional wetland).
165 See, e.g., Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730–31 (plurality opinion) (making clear that waters are
jurisdictional when they are navigable in fact or reasonably could be made navigable); 2008
Jurisdiction Guidance, supra note 16, at 4–5.
166 2008 Jurisdiction Guidance, supra note 16, at 5.
167 Id. at 5 n.20.
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Court interpretation was applied.168 Interpretation remained uncertain even
under the First Circuit’s approach, as these wetlands would still require
evaluation for significant nexus on a case-by-case basis, coupling
uncertainty before scientific findings are made with the later uncertainty of
adjudicatory discretion.169
At least in theory, the Kennedy standard shouldn’t have diminished
federal jurisdiction that much from past practice. Establishing significant
nexus harmonized with the long-established rule of Riverside Bayview
Homes,170 and presumably, the agency would be able to prove nexus
wherever it legitimately existed. However, the new requirement of case-bycase fact-finding overwhelmed agency resources. CWA enforcement began
to suffer as federal agencies withdrew from the regulatory field, reportedly
abandoning enforcement actions in hundreds if not thousands of cases in the
years following Rapanos.171 Studies showed a reversal in the previous trend
of cleaner waters nationwide, as the regulatory process bogged down under
the new jurisdictional uncertainty and process hurdles.172 Indeed, EPA issued
post-Rapanos guidance in 2008, noting that project proponents could request
a presumption of jurisdiction to speed up the increasingly time-intensive
permitting process.173

168 TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 86, at 31–32, 40–42 (noting that the plurality’s
and Justice Kennedy’s tests are “premised on entirely different analyses with little analytical
overlap”).
169 See Kristen Clark, Navigating Through the Confusion Left in the Wake of Rapanos: Why a
Rule Clarifying and Broadening Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act is Necessary, 39 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. AND POL’Y REV. 295, 297 (2014) (describing how “[t]he confusion over which test
should apply, as well as the lengthy case-by-case determinations required through the Kennedy
opinion, have led to a decrease in agency efficiency and general enforcement”); Greenberg
Traurig, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Under the Newly Issued Clean Water Rule, LEXISNEXIS,
July 21, 2015, http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/environmental/b/cleanaircleanwater/
archive/2015/07/21/clean-water-act-jurisdiction-under-the-newly-issued-clean-water-rule.aspx
(last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (discussing that one source of uncertainty with the new rule is the
case-by-case significant nexus category because the agencies’ reliance on their longstanding
expertise “adds another layer of agency discretion, and therefore uncertainty, to the ‘scientific’
determination of significant nexus”).
170 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001) (“It was the significant nexus between the
wetlands and ‘navigable waters’ that informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview
Homes.”).
171 See Duhigg & Roberts, supra note 43.
172 See Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Are Neglected, at a Cost in Human Suffering, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at A1 (reporting on the results of an extensive review of water pollution
records showing that “in recent years, violations of the Clean Water Act have risen steadily
across the nation”); N.Y. Times, Toxic Waters Project: A Series About the Worsening Pollution
in American Waters, and Regulators’ Response, projects.nytimes.com/toxic-waters (last visited
Apr. 9, 2016) (providing a collection of reports on the subject).
173 U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Regulatory Guidance Letter 08-02, Jurisdictional
Determinations, at 3 (June 26, 2008), available at http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/
2/docs/civilworks/RGLS/rgl08-02.pdf (“A landowner, permit applicant, or other ‘affected party’
may elect to use a preliminary [jurisdictional determination] to voluntarily waive or set aside
questions regarding CWA/RHA jurisdiction over a particular site, usually in the interest of
allowing the landowner or other ‘affected party’ to move ahead expeditiously to obtain a Corps
permit authorization where the party determines that is in his or her best interest to do so.”)
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As both agency and academic commentators have noted, Congress
could do more to clarify the situation,174 but despite years of political effort,
the members of Congress have been unable to break the partisan gridlock
that appears to prevent it from doing so.175 After Rapanos, several legislative
proposals were made to clarify the scope of federal jurisdiction under the
CWA. For example, Senator Russ Feingold introduced legislation that would
have amended the Act to affirm broad federal authority over waters of the
United States,176 and Senator Rand Paul later proposed a bill that would have
severely restricted federal reach.177 However, no proposal has ever made it
out of legislative committee to a full floor vote.178
Within this political context, it was therefore left to the agencies to try
again for an interpretation that would both satisfy the goals of the statute
and survive judicial review. To provide direction for regulated entities and
agency decision makers after Rapanos, the Corps issued regulatory guidance
in 2008,179 and a failed attempt was undertaken to revise the Rule itself in
2011.180 But in the years that followed, the clear need for regulatory reform
prompted the implementing agencies to revisit the Rule for what they hoped
would be the last time. This time, the architects of the revised rule drew on
the conflicting interpretations by members of the Court in Rapanos—in
particular, the approaches taken by Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens—in
forging a workable compromise in the allocation of regulatory benefits and
burdens.
IV. TRYING AGAIN: THE CLEAN WATER RULE
In 2015, after almost a decade of regulatory chaos, EPA and the Corps
finally released a new version of the Rule that took aim at the greatest
sources of uncertainty and unhappiness for both sides. The Rule—this time
anointed “the Clean Water Rule”—is the result of protracted negotiation
among agencies and stakeholders during the period of notice and comment
on the proposed rule, released in 2014,181 which drew over one million public
comments.182 While most commenters supported the proposal, some in the

174 See, e.g., Duhigg & Robert, supra note 43 (noting that the EPA’s administrator has urged
Congress to clarify jurisdiction under the CWA).
175 See COPELAND, supra note 20, at 10–11 (noting that despite various legislative options
ranging from new legislation to amendments to appropriation bill limits, “[e]ach option faces a
steep path to enactment”).
176 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
177 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
178 See COPELAND, supra note 20, at 9–10 (discussing Congress’s attempt to pass the Clean
Water Restoration Act, which seeks to clarify jurisdiction).
179 2008 Jurisdiction Guidance, supra note 16.
180 See COPELAND, supra note 17, at 1 (discussing the 2011 proposed rule, which was never
adopted, and the preceding 2008 regulatory guidance).
181 79 Fed. Reg. 22188 (Apr. 21, 2014).
182 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEAN WATER RULE RESPONSE TO COMMENTS—MASS
MAILING CAMPAIGN 2 (2015), available at http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201506/documents/cwr_response_to_comments_mass_mailing_campaigns.pdf.
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regulated community were bitterly critical.183 Opponents argued that the rule
over-claimed federal authority and would paralyze legitimate business
activity under burdensome regulations.184 Resistance was especially fierce
among agricultural interests—epitomized by the Missouri Farm Bureau’s
viral YouTube video, “That’s Enough,” which protested the Rule by
humorously parodying the popular song “Let it Go” from the Disney Movie,
Frozen.185
EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy toured the country meeting with
disgruntled opponents, attempting to reassure them that the final rule would
take account of their concerns.186 Indeed, the final rule was modified in
several areas as part of the agencies’ effort to reach a compromise with the
legitimate concerns of affected stakeholders, especially in agriculture.187 Just
as important, however, the Rule also represents a compromise between the
Supreme Court’s conflicting opinions about how far federal authority under
the CWA should extend. Different parts of the Rule respond directly to the
concerns that each of the Justices voiced in different parts of the infamously
fractured Rapanos decision. The following Sections analyze the new Clean
Water Rule, tracing the judicial provenance of core elements and exploring
the sophisticated regulatory architecture by which the Rule reconciles
competing judicial concerns.

A. The Clean Water Rule
The Clean Water Rule maintains the least controversial aspects of
earlier versions of the Rule, categorically asserting jurisdiction over
interstate waters, the territorial seas, navigable waters, and impoundments
of otherwise jurisdictional waters.188 Tributaries to these waters are also
treated as jurisdictional when there are physical indicators of flow—a bed,
banks, and ordinary high water mark.189 The Rule also asserts categorical
jurisdiction over wetlands that are adjacent to navigable waterways, defined
as such if any part is contiguous or located within a minimum of 100 feet of
the ordinary high water mark, or within the 100-year floodplain (to a

183 See id. (noting that “[t]he overwhelming majority (90%) of the mass mailing campaign
commenters expressed support for the proposed rule”).
184 See, e.g., Todd Gaziano & M. Reed Hopper, Final “Waters of the U.S.” Rule Is More
Overreach by EPA, FORBES, Aug. 3, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2015/08/03/finalwaters-of-the-u-s-rule-is-more-overreach-by-the-epa/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
185 See
Missouri Farm Bureau, That’s Enough, YOUTUBE (May 23, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9U0OqJqNbbs (last visited Apr. 9, 2016) (“That’s enough,
that’s enough. . . . Don’t need more government anyway!”).
186 Kevin Miller, Head of EPA Meets with Maine Farmers amid Controversy over Water
Quality Rules, HERALD PRESS, Nov. 30, 2015, http://www.pressherald.com/2015/11/30/head-ofepa-meets-with-maine-farmers-amid-rules-controversy/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2016).
187 See FACT SHEET, supra note 23 (including a comparison table showing where the final
rule departs from the proposed and preexisting versions of the rule).
188 40 C.F.R. § 110.1(1) (2015) (defining “waters of the United States”); see also FACT SHEET,
supra note 23 (indicating where the final Rule departs from the proposed and pre-existing
versions).
189 40 C.F.R. § 110.1(3)(iii) (2015) (defining “tributaries”).
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maximum of 1,500 feet above the ordinary high water mark).190 These
waterways will be subject to federal jurisdiction without further analysis,191
but for the first time, categorical assertions of jurisdiction are limited by a
set of measurable, physical criteria based on the best available peerreviewed science.192
The Clean Water Rule also sets forth those waterways that are
categorically excluded from jurisdiction.193 These include waste and
wastewater treatment systems, stormwater management systems, prior
converted cropland, artificial lakes and ponds constructed for various
purposes, swimming pools, puddles, erosional features, most ditches (that
are not a relocated tributary), and groundwater.194 As EPA is quick to note in
its public outreach materials, the Rule does not apply to any waterways that
have not been historically regulated under the CWA.195
Regarding waterways that do not meet any of these criteria, the Clean
Water Rule establishes a process for determining jurisdiction based on their
relationship to primary jurisdictional waters.196 Open waters without clear
geographical features, certain coastal wetlands, prairie potholes, vernal
pools, and other nonadjacent wetlands may be federally regulated if they are
shown to have a significant connection (or nexus) to navigable waterways,
because their own destruction could negatively impact the chemical,
physical, or biological integrity of the larger waterway downstream.197
Similarly, any other wetland within 4,000 feet of navigable waters or their
tributaries that are shown to have a significant nexus may be federally
regulated.198
Importantly, however, these categories of waterways will be considered
jurisdictional only if the requisite nexus is established on the basis of casespecific analysis.199 The analysis evaluates the relationship between
waterways with respect to specified hydrological and ecological functions
relating to sediment trapping, nutrient trapping, pollutant filtering and
transformation, flood water retention and attenuation, runoff storage, flow
contribution, organic matter export, food resource export, and the provision
of life cycle dependent aquatic habitat for species located on the primarily
190 Id. §§ 110.1(1), (3)(i) (defining “waters of the United States” and “adjacent”). “Adjacent”
is defined as “bordering,” “contiguous,” or “neighboring,” even if separated by natural or
artificial obstructions. Id. § 110.1(3)(i).
191 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058.
192 Id. at 37,055, 37,073, 37,104–05.
193 40 C.F.R. § 110.1(2) (2015) (listing categorical exclusions).
194
195

Id.
See FACT SHEET, supra note 23 (noting that the rule does not apply to contested

waterways such as groundwater, shallow subsurface flows, tile drains, erosional features, or
most ditches, and that it does not change policy on irrigation transfers, water transfers, or
storm water management).
196 Id. (discussing case-specific analysis for specific kinds of wetlands, and defining
“significant nexus”).
197

Id.

198

40 C.F.R. §§ 110.1(1)(viii), (3)(v) (2015) (discussing case-specific analysis for other kinds
of wetlands, and defining “significant nexus”).
199 Id. § 110.1(1)(vii)–(viii).
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jurisdictional waterway.200 Wetlands that do not significantly contribute to
the integrity of primarily jurisdictional waterways in these ways will not be
subject to federal regulation under the statute.201
The Clean Water Rule thus reflects a compromise between competing
interests in stronger and weaker regulatory reach, and between appropriate
regulatory presumptions. The categorical assertion of authority over
immediately adjacent wetlands tributaries with conventional geographical
features—regardless of intermittent flow—reflects the agencies’ acceptance
of the scientific consensus that such tributaries will almost always affect
navigable waters downstream.202 As Justices Stevens and Breyer argued in
Rapanos, this justifies the presumption in favor of regulatory jurisdiction.203
Still, the limitation of categorical authority to tributaries with “conventional
geographical features” nods to the concerns raised by Justice Scalia in
Rapanos,204 and the case-by-case analysis required for other nonnavigable
waters shows regard for the position taken there by Justice Kennedy—that
individualized inquiry is warranted when it is possible that wetlands may or
may not affect the nation’s waters more broadly.205

B. Resolving Rapanos at the Level of Regulatory Architecture
Close analysis reveals how the Clean Water Rule creates a framework
for convergence between the seemingly conflicting approaches taken by
Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens in Rapanos, and one that ultimately
incorporates proposals from the other Rapanos opinions as well.
As discussed in Part III, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and Justice
Stevens’s dissent appear to point in opposite directions—with Kennedy
rejecting the agency’s interpretation of the Rule and Stevens willing to affirm
it.206 Yet the two approaches actually rely on closely similar substantive rules
of jurisdiction, based on a nearly identical statutory analysis: according to
both Justices, federal CWA jurisdiction follows a significant nexus to
navigable waters.207 Justice Stevens was willing to defer to the agency’s

200
201

Id. § 110.1(3)(v).
See id. § 110.1(1)(vi), (viii) (outlining jurisdictional waterways and stating that wetlands

are included under the statute if they are adjacent to the outlined waterways or if they “have a
significant nexus” to those waterways).
202 See, e.g., Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,058 (June 29, 2015) (“The next two
types of waters ‘tributaries’ and ‘adjacent’ waters, are jurisdictional by rule, as defined, because
the science confirms that they have a significant nexus to traditional navigable waters,
interstate waters, or territorial seas.”). The rule also repeatedly refers to a “Science Report”
prepared by the EPA that provides the basis for the functions used to establish significant
nexus. See, e.g., id. at 37,057.
203 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
204 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (plurality opinion) (asserting that jurisdiction
should only apply to “bodies of water forming geographically cognizable features that have
direct surface connections to navigable-in-fact waters”).
205 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,059 (describing the significant nexus analysis as
consistent with Supreme Court opinions).
206 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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broad assertion of jurisdiction on grounds that nearly all waters within a
watershed are likely to impact the navigable waters downstream, and so his
interpretation initially seems the most tolerant of federal jurisdiction.208
However, Justice Kennedy’s approach would also allow jurisdiction
throughout the watershed—so long as significant nexus is shown.209 It would
presume nexus for traditionally navigable waters and their immediately
adjacent wetlands, and accept case-specific proof of it for all others.210 At
least in theory, then, his approach is equally tolerant of CWA jurisdiction, so
long as the agency’s assumptions about broad nexus are scientifically
established. For this reason, the two seemingly conflicting approaches share
a critical substantive core.
The main but crucial difference between them is simply where they
allocate the burden of proof in marginal cases. Beyond uncontroversially
navigable waters and their immediately adjacent wetlands, Justice Kennedy
put the burden squarely on the agency, while Justice Stevens put the burden
on the landowner seeking a section 404 permit to fill.211 The two approaches
establish opposite presumptions at the beginning of the analysis, effectively
requiring the opposite party to rebut the regulatory default: under Kennedy’s
approach, the agency must rebut a presumption of no jurisdiction with proof
of significant nexus, while under Stevens’s approach, a landowner can rebut
the presumption of jurisdiction by proving a lack of significant nexus.212
As the post-Rapanos era demonstrated, this small detail of legal
architecture has enormous consequences for real world governance.213 The
Kennedy approach, placing the burden of proof on the agency, became the
governing rule for most jurisdictional conflicts after Rapanos.214 Yet this
approach was extremely resource-intensive for the agencies involved,
especially in an era of extreme budgetary stress.215 After all, the postRapanos era coincided with the era of federal budget sequestration and
government shutdown.216 As a result, the implementing agencies focused
their limited attention on only those cases in which establishing jurisdiction
would not be too difficult—foregoing important enforcement actions in
cases where there might actually have been significant nexus, but where the
agency couldn’t afford to prove it.217 Indeed, an investigation by the New
York Times reported that in the years after Rapanos, EPA abandoned some
208 Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 147–154 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Stevens’s analysis).
209 Id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also supra notes 139–146 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice Kennedy’s analysis).
210 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
211 See discussion supra Part III.
212 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 797 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
213 See Duhigg & Roberts, supra note 43 and accompanying text.
214 See 2008 Jurisdictional Guidance, supra note 16, at 11–13.
215 See Duhigg & Roberts, supra note 43.
216 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., IMPACT AND COSTS OF THE OCTOBER 2013
GOVERNMENT 5 (2013), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/reports/
impacts-and-costs-of-october-2013-federal-government-shutdown-report.pdf.
217 Duhigg & Roberts, supra note 43.
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1,500 high profile enforcement actions rather than invest scarce resources
proving its jurisdiction to pursue them—including many cases where
jurisdiction was presumably provable, but prohibitively expensively so.218
Nevertheless, the Clean Water Rule pushes past the intractable conflicts
that upended the CWA after Rapanos, rejecting the all-or-nothing
approaches advocated there in favor of a regulatory compromise that
implements each strategy with regard to the waterways where it makes the
most sense. In fact, it also incorporates core elements from the other
Rapanos opinions. The new Rule incorporates parts of Justice Stevens’s
categorical deference, parts of Justice Scalia’s narrow view of a tributary,
and parts of Justice Kennedy’s case-by-case balancing to accommodate
ecological and hydrological connections, while also heeding Chief Justice
Robert’s warnings about jurisdictional limits and Justice Breyer’s advice to
clarify the formal agency findings and scientific bases for jurisdiction that
will command Chevron deference.219
The Clean Water Rule begins by incorporating Justice Stevens’s broad
deference to the agencies’ assertion of categorical jurisdiction, not only for
the noncontroversial categories of traditionally navigable waters, but also
for many tributaries and wetlands that may have required additional findings
under Justice Kennedy’s approach. However, it does so with important limits
that respond to the concerns of the other four Rapanos opinions. For
example, categorical assertions of jurisdiction for nonnavigable waters are
limited to those with the kinds of conventional geographical features that
Justice Scalia specifically referenced in his plurality opinion.220 There, he
suggested that jurisdiction “should cover only those permanent, standing,
continuously flowing bodies of water forming geographically cognizable
features that have direct surface connections to navigable-in-fact waters.”221
Under the Rule, tributaries are jurisdictional throughout the hydrological
chain, even when they are intermittent—but only those with the defined
physical characteristics of bed, bank, high water mark, and surface
connection that accord Justice Scalia’s common parlance view of what
should count as a waterway.222 While Justice Scalia would not have approved
the extension of jurisdiction to intermittent tributaries or others without a
permanent surface connection to navigable waters, the Rule directly
incorporates many of the physical limitations that he championed in
Rapanos.
Similarly, while Justice Stevens’s Rapanos approach would allow
categorical jurisdiction over nearly all wetlands,223 the portion of the Rule
218
219

Id.
See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,055 (June 29, 2015) (“In this final rule, the

agencies clarify the scope of ‘waters of the United States’ that are protected under the Clean
Water Act (CWA), based upon the text of the statute, Supreme Court decisions, the best
available peer-reviewed science, public input, and the agencies’ technical expertise and
experience in implementing the statute.”).
220 See id. at 37,058; Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 739, 742 (2006) (plurality opinion).
221 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (plurality opinion).
222 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,076.
223 Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that asserts categorical jurisdiction nods toward Scalia’s strict view of
immediate adjacency, designating only those wetlands that meet strict scales
of proximity.224 Only wetlands within 100 feet of the ordinary high water
mark or within the 100-year flood plain up to 1,500 feet of the ordinary high
water mark will be treated as jurisdictional without case-specific
analysis225—a limited categorical assertion that would likely satisfy Justice
Kennedy, and probably even Justice Scalia. These elements also heed Chief
Justice Roberts’s open admonition that the agencies more clearly
acknowledge the limits of jurisdictional authority conferred to them by the
statute.226
Moreover, even in these circumstances where the Rule categorically
presumes jurisdiction, landowners who want to fill wetlands believed to lack
significant nexus can make a formal showing to the agency of why their
proposed actions would not cause the downstream harm that the statute is
designed to prevent.227 When the agency is persuaded, it grants the section
404 permit to allow the action, effectively waiving its authority to prevent fill
in favor of the owner’s prerogative.228
The categorical part of the Clean Water Rule thus follows Justice
Stevens’s presumption in favor of the agency, while allowing the agency to
cede its legal entitlement229 to the owner when the applicant proves that a
proposed fill will not harm the nation’s waters. However, the Stevens model
of broad presumptive jurisdiction is rejected by the part of the Rule that
governs those nonnavigable waters that lack the criteria of bed and bank or
that lie beyond the categorical envelope of adjacency.230 Yet this part of the
Rule also rejects Justice Scalia’s approach of categorically rejecting
jurisdiction over such waters. Instead, the Rule here adopts Justice
Kennedy’s approach of enabling the agency to prove jurisdiction by showing
significant nexus on a case-specific basis.
To establish CWA jurisdiction over these other waters, the agency must
show that such a waterway “significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical, or

224

Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058.

225

Id.
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 37,095.
Id.; 33 C.F.R. § 325.2 (2014) (regulations governing processing of permit applications).

226
227
228

229 I use the language of legal entitlements here to differentiate between underlying
jurisdiction and the actual use of that jurisdiction to block a desired action. As I have shown in
previous work, the Calabresi and Melamed “Cathedral” vocabulary of legal entitlements can
help elucidate the negotiated exercise of regulatory jurisdiction in federalism-sensitive
contexts. ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 241–50 (2012). In this context, the
jurisdictional entitlement refers to the ability of the agency to prevent a regulated activity, or to
cede the entitlement to the landowner to act without regulatory interference. Applied here, the
Stevens approach grants the jurisdictional entitlement to the agency but allows the landowner
to shift it with a showing of no nexus, while the Kennedy approach grants the legal entitlement
to the landowner but allows the agency to shift it with a showing of significant nexus. See id. at
250–61. See also Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 13 (2010)
(discussing jurisdictional entitlements in federalism-sensitive contexts).
230 40 C.F.R. § 110.1(1)(vii)–(viii) (2015).
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biological integrity of traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, or the
territorial seas,” and if the agency meets that burden, then jurisdiction is
established.231 Here, the legal entitlement begins with the landowner, but it
can be shifted to the agency if the agency makes the required showing of a
significant nexus to other jurisdictional waters. In this way, the Rule
effectively shifts the burden of proof of significant nexus for more diffuse
and remote waters from the landowner to the agency.232
Notably, both approaches assume the possibility of significant nexus
throughout the hydrological chain, reflecting the understanding that both
Justices Stevens and Kennedy shared in Rapanos (together with Justice
Breyer, but not Justice Scalia or Chief Justice Roberts).233 Again, the only
difference is who bears the burden of proving significant nexus. In this way,
the Clean Water Rule effectively splits the difference between these two
Rapanos approaches—categorically extending jurisdiction through much of
the hydrological chain (as Justice Stevens would have done), but using caseby-case analysis of most nonadjacent wetlands (as Justice Kennedy would
have done).234
The final rule also responds to Chief Justice Roberts’s warnings that the
agencies acknowledge some kind of jurisdictional limits,235 and it
incorporates actual limits that reflect Justice Scalia’s intuitions about what
kinds of waterways should and should not require additional justification.236
Finally, in asserting a basis for these limits in the scientific record, it follows
Justice Breyer’s recommendation to more formally establish the agency’s
determination as to what extent of jurisdiction is necessary to accomplish
Congress’s goal of protecting the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the nation’s waters—so as to command greater judicial deference.237 The

231

Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,059.
Note that I am using the term “burden of proof” casually here, invoking its common
usage; I leave to the better experts of procedure whether this regulatory architecture creates a
separate burden going forward.
233 Compare Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715, 782 (2006) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“Where an
adequate nexus is established for a particular wetland, it may be permissible . . . to presume
covered status for other comparable wetlands in the region.”), and id. at 797 (Stevens, J.
dissenting) (arguing that jurisdiction over wetlands should not depend on a case-specific
analysis, because “it is enough that wetlands adjacent to tributaries generally have a significant
nexus to the watershed’s water quality”), and id. at 811 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (“Those waters
are so various and so intricately interconnected that Congress might well have decided the only
way to achieve this goal is to write a statute that defines “waters” broadly.”), with id. at 755
(plurality opinion) (asserting that “significant nexus” “appears nowhere in the Act, but is taken
from SWANCC ’s cryptic characterization of the holding of Riverside Bayview”).
234 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,056, 37,058.
235 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 217–218 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer’s analysis in
Rapanos). See also Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,055 (Jun. 29, 2015) (“In this final
rule, the agencies clarify the scope of ‘waters of the United States’ that are protected under the
Clean Water Act (CWA), based upon the text of the statute, Supreme Court decisions, the best
available peer-reviewed science, public input, and the agencies’ technical expertise and
experience in implementing the statute.”). The Rule itself leans heavily on the Science Report
that EPA relied on in promulgating the Rule: “The rule only covers as tributaries those waters
232
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Clean Water Rule thus draws important elements from each of the voices in
the Rapanos opinion that prompted its revision. Indeed, the agencies
warrant recognition for locating these elusive common threads amidst such
infamously conflicting judicial guidance.
Of course, as previously noted, alternating the legal defaults between
the Stevens and Kennedy approaches can have substantial consequences for
actual regulatory outcomes. Because shifting the burden of proof leaves
almost everything else in a legal rule unchanged, it may at first seem like a
modest adjustment—but as every litigator knows, the burden of proof can
be outcome determinative. In the wetlands context, proving the lack of
nexus where it is presumed can be expensive for the landowner, and at the
margins, may result in fewer permits to fill categorically jurisdictional
waters.238 Similarly, proving nexus on a case-specific basis may result in less
protection for noncategorical wetlands, if budgetary constraints continue to
force agencies to limit their expenditure of resources.239
In this way, a legal default that seems like a small stone in the arch of
an overall rule may yet prove to be the cornerstone—and it is in this regard
that the Clean Water Rule highlights the underappreciated significance of
regulatory architecture in difficult lawmaking. The Clean Water Rule
represents a compromise between intractably opposing positions, pleasing
no one entirely. It could thus be justified, as compromises usually are, as the
best that could be done under the circumstances. Yet its unique regulatory
architecture—the burden-shifting approach that it takes in different
hydrological contexts—confers more satisfying justification for the rule on
the basis of sound environmental policy, efficient cost allocation, and fair
process.
The Clean Water Rule alternates defaults not just to satisfy judicial
review, but because doing so will facilitate the best regulatory outcomes.
The alternating presumptions make sense in the contexts where they are

that science tells us provide chemical, physical, or biological functions to downstream waters
and that meet the significant nexus standard.” Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058. See also
Laurie C. Alexander, Science at the Boundaries: Scientific Support for the Clean Water Rule, 34
FRESHWATER SCI. 1588 (2015) (evaluating the scientific support for the legal conclusions drawn
by the Clean Water Rule).
Nevertheless, critics contend that the agency could do more to specify how it arrived at
the specific distance criteria used for establishing jurisdiction under the Rule. See, e.g., North
Dakota v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 3:15-cv-59, 2015 WL 5060744, at *6 (D.N.D. Aug. 27, 2015)
(granting a preliminary injunction while state plaintiffs challenge elements of the final Rule as
departing arbitrarily from the scientific record and failing to follow logically from the proposed
rule). See also Patrick Parenteau, A Bright Line Mistake: How EPA Bungled the Clean Water
Rule, 46 ENVTL. LAW 379 (2016) (arguing that the 4,000 foot rule is not supported by agency
science); Michael C. Blumm & Steven M. Thiel, (Ground)waters of the United States: Unlawfully
Excluding Tributary Groundwater from Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, 46 ENVTL. LAW 333 (2016)
(critiquing the exclusion of groundwater from jurisdiction as scientifically unsupported); Craig
N. Johnston & Gerald Torres, Normal Farming and Adjacency: A Last Minute Gift for the Farm
Bureau, 46 ENVTL. LAW 395 (2016) (critiquing the exclusion of normal farming activities from the
Rule’s definition of adjacency).
238 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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deployed, because categorical jurisdiction really is preserved for those cases
where the best available peer-reviewed science indicates that a fill would
cause harm,240 and case-specific analysis is saved for those cases where the
answer really is less certain.241
In this way, the rule is both environmentally and economically efficient,
erring on the side of protecting those wetlands that science suggests are
most likely to be critical to CWA objectives.242 Forcing the owner to bear the
cost of showing harm where the agency is likely to prevail will reduce the
number of owners that go forward, thus reducing the amount of resources
unnecessarily expended on both sides. Forcing the agency to bear costs
when harm is less certain should induce the agency to press for jurisdiction
only where it believes it truly necessary, reducing the expenditure of agency
resources on marginal cases and erring against jurisdictional overreach.
Litigants from both the regulated and environmental communities have
criticized certain of the lines drawn by the new Rule—especially the 4,000foot limit on case-specifically addressed non-adjacent wetlands243—but the
Chief Justice’s direct warning in Rapanos may indicate that to survive
judicial review (unless Congress finally acts itself to clarify the issue), the
agencies may be forced to engage in some degree of discretionary line
drawing.
Finally, the Clean Water Rule’s burden-shifting approach exposes some
irony in the protracted political debate after SWANCC and Rapanos, which
often casts the Waters of the United States dilemma as a federalism issue:
how far should federal regulation reach? 244 Yet in this more mechanical
analysis, federalism fades into the backdrop as regulatory architecture takes
center stage. While many have argued that Justice Kennedy’s approach in
Rapanos is more faithful to the principles of federalism than Justice
Stevens’s,245 the burden-shifting analysis reveals that the two are nearly
equivalent from the federalism perspective. The substantive rule of
jurisdiction is virtually identical: federal jurisdiction follows significant
nexus, and that is all. Once again, the key difference is who bears the burden

240

See supra note 237 and accompanying text.

241

The Rule specifically indicates that nexus should be proved in these categories because
while the science suggests that some of these waters are interdependent, it acknowledges that
others may be less so. The agencies conclude that requiring case-specific analysis will lead to
more consist administration and more scientifically sound exercises of jurisdiction. Id. at
37,059.
242 Note, however, that critics from both the environmental and regulated communities have
argued that elements of the Rule depart from the scientific record. See supra note 237
(addressing arguments in favor of and against the relationship between the Rule and the
supporting science).

Id.
See Missouri Farm Bureau, supra note 185 (criticizing the Rule’s application to
agricultural ditches in the video parody of a Disney Film, Frozen).
245 See Bradford C. Mank, Implementing Rapanos—Will Justice Kennedy’s Significant Nexus
Test Provide a Workable Standard for Lower Courts, Regulators, and Developers?, 40 IND. L.
243
244

REV. 291, 331 (2007) (“In the areas of national power and federalism, Justice Kennedy has taken
a centrist position that seeks a middle ground between Justice Scalia’s states’ rights philosophy
and Justice Stevens’s support for broad national power.”).
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of proof in establishing whether a marginal waterway satisfies this common
jurisdictional standard. But setting the burden of proof is a matter of civil
procedure, not constitutional law. As the Clean Water Rule ultimately shows,
the path forward hinges more on carefully tailored regulatory architecture
than a close reading of the Commerce Clause. And the Clean Water Rule
threads this needle in a way that might finally satisfy a majority of the Court.
V. CONCLUSION
The Clean Water Rule has thus been painstakingly constructed in a way
that should defuse the most likely assaults against it. Despite the plethora of
arguments framing the wetlands issue as a federalism cliffhanger,246 the new
Rule defuses the jurisdictional debate through sophisticated regulatory
architecture that shifts the burden of proof in contexts where the owner and
the agency should rightly bear it. In so doing, it reasonably balances the
competing considerations of environmental protection and economic
development, state and federal authority, public commons and private
property. It combines regulatory tools from civil procedure and scientific
consensus to facilitate difficult decisions where consensus has long been
lacking, taking as best account as possible of the multiple judicial
perspectives offered in the last round of Supreme Court review.
In that previous round, Rapanos, the Court’s analysis was fractured
among five opinions, each emphasizing different concerns about regulatory
reach and effectiveness, each with seemingly distinct implications for
environmental federalism.247 Those favoring more regulatory reach under the
CWA tout the Stevens and Breyer opinions, while those favoring less federal
reach tout the Kennedy opinion, the Roberts opinion, or the Scalia opinion
(which departs most dramatically from historical assertions of CWA
authority). No rule could fully satisfy each of these competing approaches,
but the Clean Water Rule capitalizes on a critical convergence between
them—especially those offered by Justices Kennedy and Stevens, which
create similar substantive rules of jurisdiction based on an identical legal
analysis: federal reach extends as far as there is significant nexus, or the
likelihood of harm to the nation’s waterways.248
The Clean Water Rule recognizes that the main difference between the
Kennedy and Stevens approaches, at least with regard to more controversial
waterways, is where each would allocate the burden of proving that harm to
the nation’s waterways will follow.249 In Rapanos, Justice Kennedy put the
burden on the agency, while Justice Stevens put the burden on the
landowner.250 Their proposals would thus establish opposite presumptions at

246 See Erin Ryan [Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within], supra note 60, at 382–84;
Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 41–42 (1999).
247 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
248 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
249 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
250 See discussion supra Part III.A.
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the beginning of the analysis, requiring different parties to rebut opposing
regulatory defaults—with Justice Kennedy requiring the agency to rebut a
presumption of no jurisdiction by proof of significant nexus, and Justice
Stevens requiring a landowner to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction by
proving a lack of nexus (and receiving permission to fill).251 The Clean Water
Rule threads the needle by adopting both presumptions, alternating them in
application to the circumstances in which each makes most sense: Justice
Stevens’s presumption of jurisdiction where harm is most likely, putting a
thumb on the scale in favor of CWA reach, and Justice Kennedy’s
presumption against jurisdiction where harm is most speculative, favoring
private autonomy.
Framing the issue of regulatory reach this way promises to tame the
environmental federalism issues that have bedeviled the waters of the
United States virtually since its inception. Now, the relevant issue sounds
more in civil procedure than constitutional law: who should bear the burden
of proof about when a waterway satisfies the common jurisdictional
standard? If we accept the uncontroversial statutory premise that Congress
designed the CWA to protect the nation’s waterways,252 then the substantive
jurisdictional standard of significant nexus seems unassailable (as the Court
itself first recognized in Riverside Bayview Homes). The jurisdictional
standard is the part of the rule that has always seemed fraught with
federalism concerns—but by shifting focus to burden allocation, the Clean
Water Rule moves the primary political debate beyond the jurisdictional
standard itself.
Of course, the followers of Justice Scalia’s position in Rapanos may not
subscribe to this approach, so the looming question remains how the
members of the Court will receive the Clean Water Rule when it inevitably
reaches them. It seems likely that Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, and
Sotomayor will approve, given their general willingness to defer to the
environmental agencies’ own determinations—but even here, uniform
approval is not certain. After all, the Clean Water Rule confers weaker
federal jurisdiction than the version they approved in Rapanos, and if there
really is scientific consensus that navigable waters depend on the health of
all waters in the watershed,253 then perhaps—as Justice Breyer himself
argued in Rapanos—the only way to meaningfully implement the
congressional intent behind the CWA are the terms of the original Rule.254
Putting the burden on the landowner in all circumstances would, as
President George H.W. Bush long ago advocated, put a thumb on the scale
against further wetlands loss.255 On balance, a more uniform presumption in
favor of jurisdiction would protect more wetlands from fill, and a
presumption against jurisdiction will protect fewer of them.256 So if the

251

Id.

252

CWA, 33 U.S.C., § 1251(a) (2012).

253

See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 203–204 and accompanying text; Duhigg & Roberts, supra note 43.

254
255
256
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changes in the Clean Water Rule are found to depart from the agency’s own
science, then it is possible (if unlikely) that a Justice in Stevens’s Rapanos
camp might reject these elements of the new Rule as arbitrary or capricious.
It seems less likely that the members of the Court who signed on to
Justice Scalia’s Rapanos opinion will defer, given that the Rule preserves the
possibility of jurisdictional determinations for waterways that Justice Scalia
categorically rejected in Rapanos, such as intermittent tributaries.257 On the
other hand, they may also be more amenable to the Clean Water Rule’s
approach than the one they rejected in Rapanos, given the jurisdictional
compromise at its heart and its incorporation of concrete physical criteria to
streamline jurisdictional determinations and limit federal reach. While the
new Rule does not adopt the narrowest jurisdictional vision that Justice
Scalia set forth in Rapanos, it acknowledges his concern that diffuse
waterways be treated differently from those with conventional features of
bed, bank, and high water mark. It respects Chief Justice Roberts’s demand
for more explicit jurisdictional limits. But of course, the coalition Justice
Scalia forged in Rapanos is entirely uncertain now that he is gone from the
Court.
As with so many cases currently headed for the Court, the defining
ballot is likely to be the one cast by Justice Kennedy. Is he likely to defer to
the agencies’ approach? Based on his reasoning in Rapanos, it seems that he
should. The Clean Water Rule adopts his jurisdictional standard of
significant nexus, and to ensure that jurisdiction follows nexus, it creates
specific, measurable parameters for establishing significant nexus to
navigable waters. Closely tracking the intuitions that inspired his own
opinion in Rapanos, the Rule constrains agency discretion on the basis of
peer-reviewed scientific consensus about the hydrological and ecological
functions of waterways.258 Ultimately, the Clean Water Rule is a compromise
in every way, so that he is no more likely to be fully satisfied than any other
adjudicator. But it is a compromise that responds carefully and logically to
the concerns that he and his colleagues have raised in previous iterations of
the Supreme Court debate, and to the competing stakeholder demands that
have been repeatedly raised in the political sphere.
For these reasons, it seems that the rule should satisfy Justice
Kennedy—but of course, predictions of Supreme Court decisions are rarely
worth their own weight. In the end, one only need count five, but now that
the membership of the reviewing Court is uncertain—as are the relevant
views of Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, who replaced Justices Souter and
Stevens since Rapanos was decided—even that seems an impossible task (in
some respects, reflecting the herculean task of the Clean Water Rule itself).

257 Compare supra note 38 and accompanying text, with Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,063 (“This diverse groups of wetlands (e.g., many Prairie potholes or vernal pools) can be
connected to downstream waters through surface water, shallow subsurface water, and
groundwater flows, and through biological and chemical connections.”).
258 FACT SHEET, supra note 23 (“The rule protects waters that are next to rivers and lakes
and their tributaries because science shows that they impact downstream waters. The rule sets
boundaries on covering nearby waters for the first time that are physical and measurable.”)
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Even so, this analysis of the science, fairness, and history of its elements
suggests that the Rule should fare well in judicial review. While it may not be
the best choice from any given perspective, it capitalizes on the best possible
common ground among them, forging a politically necessary compromise
that warrants both deference and respect.
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